Global Risk Monitor – March 29

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BFTP: On Brexit

BFTP = Blast From The Past

BREXIT ain’ gonna happen.  The political extremes on both ends have “woke” the sleepy and complacent middle, women, and the young – GMM, October 19, 2019

The March 29th exit date has come and gone.  A second referendum is the only alternative and inevitable, in our opinion.  The Brexiteers are already in the streets as we expected. Buying cable on panic and the political instability for the long march to a mid-to-high 1.40 handle.

 

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IMF Analysis Of Nafta 2.0 = Potemkin Trade Deal

Summary

  • IMF published a working paper on NAFTA 2.0 or the USMCA on March 26th
  • The trade deal still needs Congressional approval
  • The impact on GDP is negligible and the effects are relatively small at the aggregate level
  • Trade is reduced between all three nations with trade deficits in the U.S. and Canda rising slightly
  • Real wages in Mexico decline slightly and are unaffected in Canada and the U.S.
  • Automobile and parts production will be incentivized to move out of North America
  • Consumers will pay higher vehicle prices and resulting in lower demand and production
  • In other words, the deal sucks and is, at best, Potemkin, which confirmed our suspicions when it was announced.

The IMF goes deep on NAFTA 2.0 and confirms our initial conclusions from October,

More Potemkin than real beef.  Or, as they say in Texas, “big hat, no cattle.”

At first glance, with our limited information,  our conclusions are the negotiations were a huge waste of time, energy, and diplomatic capital resulting in a nugacity of a new agreement.   High drama all for naught, in our opinion.  – GMM, October 1st

IMF Conclusions

IMF economists’ main conclusions on Nafta 2.0 (see the full report here ):

  1. At the aggregate level, effects of the agreement  are relatively small
  2. Reduces trade among the three North American partners by more than US$4 billion (0.4 percent) while offering members a combined welfare gain of US$538 million
  3. Trade deficits will widen slightly in Canada ($36 million) and the United States ($275 million) but that of Mexico improves modestly
  4. Effects on real GDP are negligible
  5. Most of the benefits will come from trade facilitation measures that modernize and integrate customs procedures to further reduce trade costs and border inefficiencies
  6. Changes in trade flows will lead to structural changes in the composition of production across North America
  7. Some sectors benefit from greater trade integration while others
    experience declines in output and job losses
  8. Changes in industrial structure that result from changing trade flows prompt employees to move from contracting to expanding sectors
  9. Real wages for skilled and unskilled workers in Mexico decline slightly but wages are unaffected in Canada and the United States
  10. Tighter rules of origin in the auto sector and the labor value content
    requirement will not achieve their desired outcomes and lead to a decline in the production of vehicles and parts in all three North-American countries, with shifts toward greater sourcing of both vehicles and parts from outside of the region
  11. Consumers will face higher vehicle prices and respond with lower demanded quantities

 True to form for the Art of the Deal – little gain, lots of pain. 

Potemkin Mexico Canada Deal

 

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Permabulls For The Long Run

 

Dow_Box_Digits

I once heard the late, great financial economist Stephen Ross speak at a Lehman Brothers bond conference in Sun Valley, Idaho.  He opened his presentation with a short story about how investors would approach him and ask, “if you’re so smart, why aren’t you rich?”  He said his reply was always, “if you’re so rich, why aren’t you smart?”  Touché!

The same Socratic logic can be applied to the permabulls, who have the probabilities on their side.  The U.S. stock market likes to go up.

For example, the Dow has generated positive returns 68 percent of the years since 1921, and the S&P more than 72 percent since 1951.

Moreover, it doesn’t take much intellectual gravitas to proclaim stocks are in a “structural bull market.”  Take a look at any long-term chart, as in more than 40 years, to see that any major stock index has moved from the lower left to upper right.  The stock market, by definition, is a perpetual structural bull market.  Innovation, growth and inflation have always, over the long-term, trumped fear.

Who in their right mind would consistently bet against a permabull, even if their message never changes — “the stock market will be up this year”  — if the empirical probability of being correct is 70 percent?  Someone headed for bankruptcy, that’s who.  Permabulls for the long run!

Shorter Time Horizons

The above argument weakens significantly in shorter timeframes as the binary stock market return converges toward a random bet on a daily basis.  The S&P Significant Digits table below illustrates this as the index generates positive daily returns only 53 percent of the time, 57 percent weekly, 60 percent monthly, and 66 percent on a quarterly basis.

S&P_Significant Digits

The data also show return distributions have more of a negative skew and a higher kurtosis — fatter or longer tails — the shorter the timeframe.   That is one major factor why short-term traders have a higher risk of ruin than long-term investors.

Stock Market Annual Streaks

We were extremely surprised by the results of how rare back-to-back down years is for the Dow Jones Industrials.  Only nine times since 1921 has the Dow had a down year after suffering a negative return the prior year, which includes two 3-year and one 4-year steak.  The worst of which was the four consecutive down years at the start of the Depression, where the Hoover administration experienced a negative stock market every year in office, as the Dow lost 62 percent of its value.

Keeping with our theme,  “the stock market likes socialism,”  or government (or the Fed) bailout/interventions,  the best year in the Dow was in 1933 after FDR took power and began to implement the New Deal.   The 36 percent 3-year moving average of annual returns in 1936 topped the second highest level of 1997 by almost 1000 bps. 

Of the 98 years of Dow returns we looked at since 1921, 46 percent generated back-to-back positive years, with the longest streak, the 9-year bull market ending in 1999,  which lifted the Dow by 337 percent.  The streak ended with the bursting of the dot.com bubble in Q1 2000, which then resulted in three straight down years in the Dow.   

Thus, given the above data, after a down year,  such as 2018, there is about a 90 percent empirical probability the Dow will generate a positive return in the next year, which implies annual returns are not independent.  Rather stunning odds, nonetheless. 

 

Dow_Box_Streaks

 

Upshot

So what about 2019?

We don’t know and can’t say with any certainty, but given how rare it is for back-to-back down years,  the higher probability bet would be for a Dow higher than where it started the year.   Moreover,  the average return for bounce years suggests the Dow, up 9.4 percent year-to-date, has around another 10 percent to go.

The big caveat, and the uncharted water Mr. Market currently finds itself is the shape of the yield curve.  Though there are four trading days left in the month, 2019 could be the first bounce year since 1960 (our start year) where the yield curve is negative at the end of March.

Dow_Box_Dow Bounce

 

Conclusion

Considering and internalizing the above data, it would then behoove investors to always keep timeframes long-term.  The financial media, including this blog, is rendered mostly noise and, at best, entertainment for long-term investors.

There are a few times in history, however, – we count five – where reducing risk was a smart move, which allowed investors to reinvest at a significantly lower price without the risk of being left behind in a V bottom bounce.  Those times to sell were in the 1910s, 1929, late 1960s, Q1 2000, and 2007, most of which were known at the time to be a period of historically high and extended valuations but justified by the mass and social media as a “this time is different” situation.

We are not even sure most even see what we perceive or they choose to ignore it, surrendering to the all the rage passive investing, which, ironically, is based on the very analysis in this post.

Given the current combination of historically high market valuations, the high levels of sovereign and corporate debt, record-high budget deficits, the shifting geopolitical tectonic plates, the end of the post-War era and Pax Americana,  and the extreme wealth and income disparities,  we sense today is one of those times.  That is why we are and will continue to take money off the table in this rally, which we suspect will be the blow off before another historic Big Dipper,  that is a 40 plus percent bear market.

The global monetary authorities will then likely kick into full monetization mode with new regimes, such as a “People’s QE”, which directly finance consumption and other schemes to finance infrastructure investment, for example.   Our brothers and sisters in the MMT crowd will finally have their day and the people will suffer the consequential inflation and stagflation as confidence in the currency plummets, and money demand collapses.   This may take some time to play out but we are fairly confident, play out it will.

The deflatiionistas will, for sure, win the next few battles but, we are almost certain, will lose the war.

We are also cognizant our scenario contradicts the historical data and, as always, we reserve the right to be wrong.  Like us,  investors should always have a Plan B, whatever their strategy,  in the event they are wrong.

Stay tuned.

Dow_Box_Times Series

 

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Week In Review – March 22

Summary

  • Big move in 10-year yields fueled by dovish Fed and ugly German economic data
  • German 10-year Bund yields crossed into negative territory
  • Turkey and Brazil bond yields blow out on currency weakness and Brazil’s political risk we spoke about at the start of the year now biting
  • Major Latin FX getting spanked why Asia hangs in
  • S&P down less than 1 percent on the week though felt worse. Friday’s close fugly
  • Latin stocks spanked
  • Russell, the January, and February darling giving the most back of U.S. majors
  • Gold starting to catch a bid again

Commentary:  Our Power of  Zero (POZ) thesis, i.e., markets are driven by yield-chasers panicked that interest rates are going to zero,  had a big set back on Friday’s ugly German data and the feedback into the U.S. yield curve.  As we said, last week POZ would be a bullish driving force for markets until we see the white in the eyes a global recession.  The market thought they saw white on Friday.

Still, we believe the markets should settle down this week unless more super ugly economic data confirms.   The yield curve is freaking out traders and investors, and the Fed is now paying the consequences of its over-engineering in the interest rate complex.

It’s not just the Fed, but the major global central banks.   French Oats 230 bps through the U.S Treasury in a currency nobody can say with certainty will be around in ten years?  Come on, man!   Global monetary policy = reductio ad absurdum.

Staying close to home until we see if Friday’s volatility carries over into the new week and watching the data.  Note the Atlanta’s Fed GDP now forecast for Q1 2019 has moved up from around 0.5 percent at the beginning of the month to around 1.2 percent, which is a big move lost on the markets.

The markets are now pricing almost a 20 percent probability of a Fed rate cut by the June meeting, and a 67 probability by January 2020 with a 20 percent probability of an additional cut. We don’t see a recession this year in the U.S. and once the markets get through this squall should begin to move higher.

Unless this time is different.  The year’s record start, after a down year, implies a higher S&P not only in March but by the end of the year.  See the table below.

Back to back down years are very rare.  We are working on a big piece on this which should be posted early in the week.

Nevertheless, though we think stocks finish the year higher, we don’t like the market and have been selling out on the way up.  The longer-term valuations are way too high or close to record highs, the global geopolitical tectonic plates are shifting, and the post-War order is crumbling.

Longer-term investors should not be chasing markets here, in our opinion,  and using the strength to take risk off into this, what we believe, will be the speculative blow-off before the Big Dipper, providing investors with a chance  to buy cheaper.

Those depending on the year-end bone — all of the Street — and traders who depend on weekly cash flow to feed their children will end up chasing this market higher as TINA will seduce and force them in.  TINA as in (T)here (I)s (N)o (A)lternative.  Two percent 10-years in the U.S. and negative rates in Germany ain’t gonna pay the rent, folks.

Finally, global central banks have FUBARed the economic signals,  which have been traditionally extracted from interest rates and yield curves.  How in the hell is one supposed to divine info about anything after years of engineering yield curves and central bank bond purchases that now price Portugal’s 10-year sovereign risk (1.26 percent) at almost half that of the United States (2.46 percent)?   That is a double rainbow in our book, folks.  What does it mean?

Yada, yada, yada!.   The relative Euro/U.S. 10-year yields reflect interest rate parity, and the path of the spot dollar will follow the forward rate lower against the euro over the next ten years.   Yeah, right.  Good luck with that trade.

How ironic would it be if market fears based on distorted interest rates and yield curves are a major factor in taking down the global economy?

Imagine Jay Powell trying to explain that one or POTUS and S. Moore trying to understand it!

2019 Q1 GDP Forcast Has Almost Doubled Since March 1

GDP_Now

Is This Time Different Because Of The Yield Curve?

 

WIR_March22_Hot Months

Financials ETF Breaks All Four Major Moving Averages 

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Brazil ETF Moves From Top Dog To Middle of Pack

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Bg Move Down In Global 10-year Yields

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QOTD: More On Moore

QOTD = Quote of the Day

Memo to Senate: Just Say No

…today the president nominates Stephen Moore to be a Fed governor. Steve is a perfectly amiable guy, but he does not have the intellectual gravitas for this important job. If you doubt it, read his latest book Trumponomics (or my review of it). – Greg Mankiw, Harvard University 

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Vol Spike…

https://twitter.com/alexus309/status/1109537029912711168?s=12

 

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Sector ETF Performance – March 22

ETF_Day

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ETF_Month

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Global Risk Monitor – March 22

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Exactly As We Suspected…

Ugghhh….

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